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Abstract 
Although research has established that autobiographical memory affects one‘s self-concept, little 
is know about how it affects moral behavior. We focus on a specific type of autobiographical 
memory: childhood memories. Drawing on research on memory and moral psychology, we 
propose that childhood memories elicit moral purity, which we define as a psychological state of 
feeling morally clean and innocent. In turn, heightened moral purity leads to greater prosocial 
behavior. In Experiment 1, participants instructed to recall childhood memories were more likely 
to help the experimenter with a supplementary task than were participants in a control condition, 
and this effect was mediated by moral purity. In Experiment 2, the same manipulation increased 
the amount of money participants donated to a good cause, and both implicit and explicit 
measures of moral purity mediated the effect. Experiment 3 provides further support for the 
process linking childhood memories and prosocial behavior through moderation. In Experiment 
4, we find that childhood memories led to punishment of others‘ ethically-questionable actions. 
Finally, in Experiment 5, both positively-valenced and negatively-valenced childhood memories 
increased helping compared to a control condition. 
 
Keywords: Autobiographical memory; Childhood; Ethics; Memories; Morality; Prosocial 
Behavior; Punishment; Purity 
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Memories based on past experiences are an important part of our life as they help us 
create and maintain our identity (Brewer, 1986; Robinson, 1986). By sharing our past 
experiences with others and by listening to their memories we can build and strengthen social 
relationships (Bauer, Stennes, & Haight, 2003). The recollection of past experiences that affect 
the development of ―who we are‖ as individuals form our autobiographical memory (Baddeley, 
1995; Brewer, 1986; Conway, 1990; Nelson, 1993; Robinson, 1992; Rubin, 1986).  
Scholars have long displayed an interest in autobiographical memory (e.g., Colegrove, 
1899; Galton, 1879; Miles, 1893), and have conducted insightful work from various perspectives 
(see Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000, and Fivush, 2011 for thorough reviews). Prior research 
has examined how this particular form of memory develops (e.g., Fivush, 1993; Nelson, 1993), 
what explains differences in accessibility and accuracy of past experiences (e.g., Conway, 1990, 
1996; Conway & Rubin, 1993), and the relationship between emotion or culture and 
autobiographical memories (e.g., Levine, Stein, & Liwag, 1999; Han, Leichtman, & Wang, 
1998).  
At any given moment, only a subset of our autobiographical memories are accessible or 
active in our mind, and that subset influences how we view ourselves at that moment (Markus & 
Kunda, 1986; Markus & Nurius, 1986; Sanitoso, Kunda, & Fong, 1990). For instance, people 
who are asked to recall instances of past extraverted actions view themselves as more extraverted 
than those asked to recall instances of past introverted actions (Fazio, Effrein, & Falender, 1981). 
Similar effects have also been shown in the case of one‘s own self-esteem (Jones, Rhodewalt, 
Berglas, & Skelton, 1981) and perceived verbal skills (Sherman, Skov, Hervitz, & Stock, 1981).  
Although research provides valuable insights into the nature of autobiographical memory 
and how it affects the self-concept, it offers less information about the impact of past memories Memory Lane and Morality  4 
on one‘s own sense of morality and subsequent behavior. The particular conceptions of the self 
that are active at a given time regulate and direct individuals‘ behavior (Bandura, 1989; Markus 
& Ruvolo, 1989). So, if autobiographical memories elicit a sense of heightened morality and 
moral self-concept as we hypothesize, then they are likely to also impact subsequent behavior 
that is consistent with the activated and now salient self-concept.  
In this paper, we focus on a specific type of autobiographical memory: the recollection of 
experiences related to one‘s own childhood. Drawing on research on autobiographical memory 
and on moral psychology, we argue that recalling childhood memories influences the extent to 
which we see ourselves as morally pure. We also suggest that this heightened sense of moral 
purity, in turn, leads to greater prosocial behavior (i.e., behavior that directly benefits others).  
Across five experiments that employ various measures of prosocial behavior, we tested 
the relationship between childhood memories, moral purity and prosocial behavior.            
Moral Domains and Moral Purity 
Moral psychology research views morality as pertaining to five distinct moral domains 
(Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; see also Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 
1997): harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect and purity/sanctity. 
Moral domains refer to sets of principles, rules, and values that identify what is good and 
virtuous, and how individuals ought to behave (Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009). When 
a given behavior violates the rules of one of these moral domains, then people judge it as morally 
inappropriate or wrong. These five moral domains are universal: they are basic, innate domains 
of morality that are present in every culture (Horberg et al., 2009).  
Of particular relevance for this paper is the domain of purity. This domain involves 
values, rules and principles regarding the protection of the sanctity of a person‘s body and soul Memory Lane and Morality  5 
(Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). It encompasses the belief that people should 
strive to live in a pure, sacred way: both their mind and their body should be clean, chaste and 
pure (Horberg et al., 2009). Behaviors that are inconsistent with these values and principles are 
thus impure and also immoral. So, for instance, behaviors that are profane, self-polluting, 
disgusting, hedonistic or ungodly are judged by people to be immoral (Haidt & Joseph, 2007; 
Horberg et al., 2009; Rozin, Lowery, et al., 1999). Thus, in this framework, purity has moral 
significance, even if it may not be as high as that of other moral domains (Shweder et al., 1997). 
Drawing on this research, we define moral purity as a psychological state that results 
from a person‘s view of the self as clean from a moral standpoint, and through which a person 
feels innocent and virtuous. Prior research on embodied moral cognition has demonstrated that 
physical purity is an effective metaphor for moral purity (Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff, 1986). 
Consistent with this metaphor, research has found that reminders of past moral transgressions 
enhance the desire for physical cleansing (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006), and that clean scents and 
clean environments promote virtuous behaviors (Liljenquist, Zhong, & Galinsky, 2008, 2010). 
Prior work has also established that clothes of an evil person are considered physically repulsive 
(Rozin, Markwith, & McCauley, 1994), and that disgust leads to harsher condemnations of moral 
violations (Haidt & Hersh, 2001; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). More recently, building on these 
findings, Sherman and Clore (2009) found that people automatically associate morality and 
immorality with the colors white and black. 
Here, we extend this research in three important ways. First, we provide a clear definition 
of moral purity and identify measures for this construct. Second, we examine a new, previously 
overlooked trigger of moral purity, namely one‘s own childhood memories. Third, we propose Memory Lane and Morality  6 
and demonstrate that the experience of moral purity is directly linked to moral behaviors (i.e., 
prosocial behaviors).  
Childhood Memories and Heightened Moral Purity 
Several scholars have demonstrated that remembering is a reconstructive process (Barlett, 
1932; Hyman & Pentland, 1996). When people are asked to recall a past experience, they do not 
retrieve the memory as a whole entity; rather, they construct the memory using the information 
available in their memory as well as related knowledge (e.g., Barclay & DeCooke, 1988; Barlett, 
1932; Neisser, 1982). In fact, scholars have suggested that, at times, information received after 
the event being recalled can erase or overwrite the original information (Loftus, 1979; Loftus, 
Donders, Hoffman, & Schooler, 1989), leading individuals to create false memories.   
In the case of childhood memories, people may recall specific events from their past (e.g., 
the first time they made a friend in preschool) but they may also include information regarding 
their general views about children and childhood (e.g., ―children are innocent creatures‖). When 
recalling their past experiences as a child, we propose, people may start thinking about childhood 
more generally. Even if they do not think about it explicitly, the concept of childhood will be 
activated in their mind. As a result, we suggest, these general views about childhood may color 
the psychological state people are in as they recall their experience as children. But what are the 
general views we have of childhood? 
Across cultures, children are commonly viewed as innocent and pure human beings who 
are not tainted by vices or selfish motives (James, Jenks, & Prout, 1998; Woodrow, 1999), and 
are regarded as little angels that adults have a duty to protect (Branscombe, Castle, Dorsey, 
Surbeck & Taylor, 2000; Scott & Watson-Brown, 1997). The words commonly used to refer to 
children, including ―innocent creatures,‖ ―little angels,‖ ―flowers,‖ or ―divine creatures‖ mirror Memory Lane and Morality  7 
this view. In a similar vein, Froebel‘s metaphor of kindergarten, the ―garden of children‖, 
portrays children as seedlings, in a state of natural goodness, to be nurtured and cared for during 
their development (Aries, 1962). This image of the child as innocent is constantly represented in 
the sentimental world of greeting cards, in the arts and literature, in religion, and it is also played 
out in the media portrayal of tragic events including children. When children are involved, the 
event is often characterized as something that has taken away children‘s innocence, as if 
innocence and purity are inherent characteristics of childhood (Woodrow, 1999).  
These common associations between childhood and moral purity are not altogether 
surprising in light of the extensive work in developmental psychology suggesting that children 
indeed are often kind and fair (e.g., Bloom, in press; Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007; Warneken 
& Tomasello, 2007).
1 Considerable evidence indicates that prosocial behavior begins quite early 
in development (Kakavoulis, 1998; Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; see also Eisenberg, 
Fabes, & Spinrad, 2006). From the age of two, prosocial behavior becomes a distinct behavior in 
children‘s behavioral repertoires, and also an important determinant of their growing social 
competence (Knafo & Plomim, 2006; Persson, 2005). For example, research has found that 
children who are just four years old spontaneously try to comfort people in distress by caressing 
them or offering them a bottle or toy (Dunn & Kendrick, 1979; Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, & 
King, 1979). If they perceive that someone is need of help, children of similar ages try to reach 
over and assist them (Warneken, Hare, Melis, Hanus, & Tomasello, 2007). And if they witness 
someone behaving kindly toward others, they try to reward them (Hamlin et al., 2007; Jacob & 
Dupoux, 2008). 
                                                      
1 Although kindness and fairness are not the same constructs as moral purity, like purity, they belong to the domain 
of morality and are associated with moral goodness. Memory Lane and Morality  8 
Although these associations between childhood and moral purity exist in arts and religion 
across cultures, to date they have been not empirically studied. Research has consistently found 
that once a concept is activated, associated concepts (from traits to stereotypes to goals) are also 
triggered through spreading activation (Bargh, 1997; Neely, 1977). For instance, coldness and 
loneliness (Zhong & Leonardelli, 2008) or darkness and aggression (Frank & Gilovich, 1988) are 
examples of symbolic associations that are reciprocally related. The initial activation may occur 
because of a situational cue, such as an object, a word or a symbol in the surrounding 
environment (Bargh, 1994, 1997; Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996).  
Here, we suggest that the initial activation occurs because of childhood memories: When 
people are asked to recall their past experiences as children, the concept of childhood is activated 
and, by association, it then triggers the concept of moral purity. In general, autobiographical 
memories influence one‘s sense of self (Bruner, 1986; Neisser, 1988). In the case of childhood 
memories, we propose, one‘s moral self-concept is likely to become more salient as a result of 
the association between the concept of childhood and that of moral purity. Thus, we hypothesize 
that recalling childhood memories increases individuals‘ perceived moral purity. 
We propose that the association between childhood and moral purity that is triggered by 
childhood memories not only occurs explicitly (i.e., when the concept of childhood is activated 
people report feeling morally pure) but also implicitly (i.e., when the concept of childhood is 
activated, the concept of moral purity is also activated automatically in people‘s mind). An 
increasing number of studies have found evidence for the reciprocal and unconscious activation 
of symbolic associations, such as filth and sin (Liljenquist et al., 2010; Rozin et al., 1986), or 
white and pure (Sherman & Clore, 2009).  Memory Lane and Morality  9 
Congruent concepts are linked together in individuals‘ memory within a network of 
nodes. When one concept is activated (e.g., filth), this activation spreads along the network and 
results in the activation of related concepts (e.g., sin), and this spreading occurs automatically 
(Anderson, 1976, 1983; Collins & Loftus, 1975). Across contexts, individuals are commonly not 
aware of the effect of the cue on the activation of the primed construct.  
We suggest that childhood memories operate in the same way: When recalling memories 
from one‘s own past experiences as a child, the general concept of childhood will be activated. In 
turn, this concept will automatically activate the related construct of moral purity. In short, we 
expect that recalling childhood memories will automatically activate notions of moral purity. 
Childhood Memories, Moral Purity and Prosocial Behavior 
Over the last two decades, social psychology research has demonstrated the effects 
priming can have on behavior. Priming refers to the situational activation of mental constructs 
(Bargh et al., 1996; Bargh et al., 2001), and its effects on behavior are mainly driven by these 
constructs (Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001). As explained by Fitzsimons, Chartrand, and Fitzsimons 
(2008: p. 22), ―Constructs associated with the primed representation guide behavior through a 
direct perception-behavior link, when people‘s behavior mirrors a perceived construct.‖ For 
instance, because individuals‘ mental representation of a library is linked to the construct 
―silence,‖ when people are primed with the construct library through a picture, ―silence‖ is also 
activated in their minds (as shown by Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2003). As a result, because of links 
to behavioral representations, the activated construct leads to an increased likelihood that the 
corresponding behavior will result (i.e., people will lower their voice when talking). 
By the same token, to the extent that people‘s mental representation of childhood is 
linked to the construct ―moral purity,‖ when people are primed with the construct childhood as Memory Lane and Morality  10 
they recall and write about their childhood memories, ―moral purity‖ will be activated in their 
minds. In turn, the activated construct of moral purity will lead to increased prosocial behavior 
since that behavior is consistent with a self-concept that is clean from any immoral concerns.  
Recent evidence in moral psychology is suggestive of a link between moral purity and 
prosocial behavior. Research has demonstrated that feeling morally impure (e.g., because one 
hand-copied a first person account of unethical behavior) increases one‘s desire for physical 
cleanliness (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). Related studies have focused on the inverse relationship 
(i.e., cleanliness  moral behavior) and have found that clean scents and visual cleanliness 
promote virtuous behaviors by increasing the tendency to reciprocate trust and to offer charitable 
help (Liljenquist et al., 2008, 2010). 
Like other internal, psychological states that provide systematic input into complex moral 
judgments and behaviors (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001, 2003; Horberg, Oveis, & Keltner, 
2011), we expect moral purity to lead to prosocial behavior. Prosocial behavior refers to actions 
that people intentionally undertake in order to help or benefit others (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990), 
as in the case of helpful interventions (e.g., Batson, 1987; Cialdini et al., 1987), donations of 
time, blood or money (e.g., Frey & Meier, 2004; Piliavin & Callero, 1991), and volunteer work 
(e.g., Foster, Mourato, Pearce, & Ozdemiroglu, 2001; Freeman, 1997).  
Once the psychological state of moral purity is activated, people are likely to engage in 
behaviors that are consistent with a pure and morally clean self-concept. As we noted earlier, 
autobiographical memories tend to be self-representative such that we infer from them who we 
are and what our self-identity is (Bruner, 1986; Neisser, 1988). Once a given self-identity is 
activated, it guides our behavior in the current situation. Recalling childhood events activates the 
notion that we were once morally pure beings (since children, in general, are considered as such), Memory Lane and Morality  11 
and this attribute of purity serves to direct subsequent behaviors that are consistent with that self-
identity. Long-standing evidence in social psychology indicates that people strive for consistency 
within their attitudes, beliefs, and behavior (Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1958). The desire to behave 
consistently with one‘s own personal values, beliefs, or previous choices, is generally very strong 
and leads people to behave in ways that are consistent over time as in the case of compliance 
with requests consistent with a commitment we made in the past (Cialdini, 2001).  
When moral purity is activated, people‘s moral self-concept is likely to be salient as well 
as their desire to remain morally clean. One way to realize this desire is to behave prosocially if 
given the opportunity. Thus, we expect moral purity triggered by childhood memories to lead to 
prosocial behavior. Furthermore, we expect moral purity to mediate the relationship between 
recalling childhood memories and prosocial behavior. 
 Overview of Experiments 
Five experiments tested the hypothesis that childhood memories make people experience 
a sense of moral purity both consciously and unconsciously, leading them to behave prosocially 
toward others by being willing to help, by donating money to a good cause, or by punishing 
others for their unethical actions.  
In Experiment 1, we tested whether having participants recall memories from their 
childhood would increase their sense of moral purity and the likelihood that they would help 
someone in the present. In Experiment 2, we tested whether recalling childhood memories would 
make people more likely to donate money to a good cause and whether this relationship would 
be mediated by an implicit measure of moral purity. In Experiment 3, we tested for moral purity 
as the mechanism explaining the relationship between childhood memories and prosocial 
behavior through moderation. In Experiment 4, we used a different form of prosocial behavior, Memory Lane and Morality  12 
namely punishment of others‘ ethically-questionable actions. Through this form of behavior, 
individuals punish others for their actions, even if the punishment is costly for them and yields 
no material gain (Fehr & Gachter, 2002). In this study, we found that participants primed with 
childhood memories judged the ethically-questionable behavior of others more harshly compared 
to participants in a control condition. This study also tested whether having children moderates 
the relationship between childhood memories and prosocial behavior. Finally, in Experiment 5 
we distinguished between recalling good versus bad memories from childhood, and 
demonstrated that the link between childhood memories and prosocial behavior holds for both 
types of memories. 
Experiment 1: Helping Others 
We designed Experiment 1 to provide initial evidence that recalling memories from 
childhood causes people to feel morally pure and behave prosocially toward others. First, we 
wanted to determine whether a sense of moral purity can be experienced when recalling and 
writing about one‘s own childhood. Second, we wanted to determine whether experiencing moral 
purity motivates people to help others in need.  
To achieve these goals, we asked participants to recall positively-valenced memories 
from their childhood versus their last visit to the grocery store (in the control condition), and then 
we asked them to respond to items measuring moral purity. Toward the end of the study, 
participants were asked whether they wanted to help the experimenter with an additional, 
optional task, allowing us to assess prosocial behavior. We predicted that participants‘ 
recollection of their childhood would make them feel morally pure, leading them to be more 
helpful toward the experimenter. 
Method Memory Lane and Morality  13 
Participants. One hundred thirteen undergraduates (58 female; Mage=20.53; SD=2.07) 
from a university in the Southeastern United States participated in a laboratory study in exchange 
for partial course credit. 
Procedure. Participants were directed to a computer in a laboratory room and began 
reading the instructions on the screen. In the first part of the study, participants were asked to 
describe events in their lives. They were told that they would write a brief essay on something 
that they do frequently, and then they would write a brief essay on something that happened at a 
particular time. They were told that they could spend 5–10 min writing each essay. The first 
essay asked them to describe their morning routine in detail; this was used to disguise the true 
purpose of the study. The second essay‘s topic varied by condition. In the childhood condition, 
participants wrote an essay in response to the following prompt: ―Please think about your 
childhood and good memories you have from it. Please write a few paragraphs describing them 
and one event that you still remember to this date. Please provide as many details as possible so 
that another person reading what you wrote could understand how you felt at that time.‖ In the 
control condition, the first part of the prompt read: ―Please think about the last time you were at 
the supermarket shopping. Please write a few paragraphs describing this situation and one item 
or product that you purchased.‖ The second part of the prompt was the same as in the childhood 
condition. Thus, participants in both conditions were instructed to describe something positive 
that happened in their lives, but we expected the control essays to have nothing to do with one‘s 
own childhood. 
Participants then reported on a 7-point scale the extent to which, at the present moment, 
they felt the 10 positive emotions (i.e., attentive, interested, alert, enthusiastic, excited, inspired, 
proud, determined, strong and active, α=.93) and the 10 negative emotions (distressed, upset, Memory Lane and Morality  14 
hostile, irritable, scared, afraid, ashamed, guilty, nervous, and jittery, α=.92) that comprise the 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; see Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). After 
completing unrelated filler tasks for about 5 minutes, participants indicated their agreement on a 
7-point scale (1=Strongly disagree, 7=Strongly agree) with two moral purity items and five 
personality-related filler items (e.g., ―I have a good memory‖) presented in random order. The 
moral purity items were ―I feel innocent,‖ and ―I feel morally pure.‖ We used the mean of the 
two moral purity items as to measure moral purity (α=.84).  
Finally, participants completed a 2-item manipulation check (―The writing task I 
completed made me think about the time I was a child,‖ ―The writing task I completed made me 
go back to my childhood‖) using a similar 7-point scale (1=Strongly disagree, 7=Strongly agree). 
We combined responses to the two items (α=.97) to form a single index. 
The helping request was the last measure administered. Instructions on the computer 
screen informed participants that they had completed the study but that they had the option of 
helping the experimenter with an extra task described as ―pilot testing for another project.‖ The 
instructions clarified that this was totally voluntary and not part of the original experiment. On 
the next screen, participants indicated whether they wanted to help with this extra task. If they 
agreed to help, they went on to answer a brief questionnaire about sports and health habits. If 
they decided not to help, this questionnaire was skipped. Then participants were asked to guess 
the hypothesis of the study and to report whether they were suspicious of anything. Finally, they 
were debriefed.  
Results 
Preliminary analyses. An examination of the free-response essays showed that 
participants in the childhood-memories condition wrote about a wide variety of situations, such Memory Lane and Morality  15 
as listening to a particular type of music, playing with friends, or engaging for the first time in an 
activity such as riding a bicycle. 
Three participants expressed suspicion that the request for help with the extra task was 
what the researchers were actually interested in. We excluded these three participants from all 
subsequent analyses for clarity of interpretation, but the results reported below were the same 
regardless of whether we included (N=113) or excluded (N=110) these suspicious participants. 
Manipulation check. Our manipulation was effective: participants who recalled 
memories from their childhood reported the writing task made them think more about the time 
they were children (M=5.43, SD=1.37) compared to participants in the control condition 
(M=2.03, SD=1.49), t(108)=12.12, p<.001, d=2.36. 
Moral purity. As we predicted, participants in the childhood condition reported a higher 
mean moral-purity score (M=3.73, SD=1.79) than did control participants (M=2.38, SD=1.41), 
t(108)=4.42, p<.001, d=0.86. 
Prosocial behavior. A larger percentage of participants who recalled childhood 
memories (75% of them) were willing to help the experimenter by completing the extra task than 
that of participants in the control condition (54.5% of them), χ
2(1, N=110)=4.72, p=.03, Cramer‘s 
V=.21. This result indicates that based on the odds ratio participants were 2.35 times more likely 
to help if they recalled childhood memories than if they recalled a neutral event. 
Mediation by moral purity. When both condition and moral purity were entered into a 
logistic regression model predicting helping on the extra task, as hypothesized, moral purity was 
significant (b=.94, SE b=.22), Wald χ
2=17.78, p<.001, but condition was no longer significant 
(b=-.10, SE b=.50), Wald χ
2<1, p=.85. Using the bootstrapping method (with 10,000 iterations) 
recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2004), we tested the significance of the indirect effect of Memory Lane and Morality  16 
condition on helping behavior through self-reported moral purity. The 95% confidence interval 
for the indirect effect did not include zero (.58, 2.54), indicating that moral purity was a mediator 
in this experiment as we predicted. 
Positive and negative affect. We then examined whether our manipulation influenced 
participants‘ positive and negative affect. Participants in the childhood-memories condition 
reported about the same levels of positive affect (M=3.01, SD=1.22) as those in the control 
condition (M=3.00, SD=1.35), t(108)<1, p=.96, d=.01. Thus, affect was not positively correlated 
with recalling memories from one‘s own childhood. Similarly, negative affect was not correlated 
with recalling childhood memories (M=1.63, SD=0.90 vs. M=1.47, SD=0.74, t[108]=1.06, p=.29, 
d=.21), thus ruling out the possibility that the control condition was tedious compared to the 
childhood condition. 
Discussion 
After recalling and writing about memories from their childhood, participants were more 
likely to agree to help the experimenter. Furthermore, we demonstrated that recalling childhood 
memories led participants to experience a heightened sense of moral purity. Our first test of the 
mediation model (that remembering memories from one‘s own childhood leads to prosocial 
behavior because of an increased sense of moral purity) yielded a significant result, providing 
initial support for the mediating role of moral purity. 
Experiment 2: Donating Money to a Good Cause 
In Experiment 2, we provide further evidence for the relationship between childhood 
memories and prosocial behavior by using a different measure to assess prosocial behavior. 
Specifically, we employed a continuous measure by asking participants to donate money to a 
good cause, rather than relying on a single dichotomous measure as we did in Experiment 1.  Memory Lane and Morality  17 
Experiment 2 differed from Experiment 1 in three other important ways. First, we used a 
different control condition. To provide a more controlled test of our hypotheses, participants in 
the control condition were asked to recall and write about memories from the time they were in 
high school (i.e., a different type of autobiographical memory). Second, we employed an implicit 
measure of moral purity in addition to a self-reported measure. Specifically, we used a word-
completion task to measure non-conscious activation of the construct of moral purity. Word-
fragment completion tests assess implicit cognitive processes (Bassili & Smith, 1986; Tulving, 
Schacter, & Stark, 1982), thus allowing us to test whether childhood memories influence 
participants‘ choice of words and their implicit thought processes. 
Finally, we included a measure of nostalgia in Experiment 2 to test this emotion as 
alternative potential mediator of our effect. Childhood memories are one of the many memories 
from one‘s own past that can promote nostalgic feelings (Sedikides, Wildschut, Arndt, & 
Routledge, 2008). In turn, nostalgic feelings may lead to prosocial behavior because of three 
main reasons. First, nostalgia serves as a repository of positive affect (Wildschut, Sedikides, 
Arndt, & Routledge, 2006) and leads people to experience ―a feeling of elation‖ (Kaplan, 1987, 
p. 465). And previous research has found that positive affect often promotes prosocial behaviors 
(e.g., Berkowitz, 1987; Carlson, Charlin, & Miller, 1988; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1991). Second, 
nostalgia enhances positive self-regard (Wildschut et al., 2006), it increases the implicit 
accessibility of positive self-attributes and attenuates self-esteem defense (Vess, Arndt, 
Routledge, Sedikides, & Wildschut, 2008). In turn, this positive self-regard may lead to other-
oriented behaviors that can reinforce one‘s own positive self-image as demonstrated by work on 
moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Finally, nostalgia strengthens social bonds (Wildschut et 
al., 2006). During nostalgic reverie, ―the mind is ‗peopled‘‖ (Hertz, 1990, p. 195). When Memory Lane and Morality  18 
individuals experience nostalgic feelings, close others come to be momentarily part of one‘s 
present. This heightened sense of social connection may lead to an increased concern for others 
and, as a result, promote prosocial behavior. In fact, when people feel socially excluded, they are 
less likely to behave prosocially (Twenge et al., 2007). 
Method 
Participants. Eighty-seven undergraduates (44 female; Mage=20.89; SD=1.85) from local 
universities in the Southeastern United States participated in a laboratory study in exchange for 
$12 ($2 show-up fee and an additional $10).  
Procedure. Participants were seated at a computer in a laboratory room and were 
informed that they would participate in a series of unrelated tasks. They first received a 15-min 
bogus task after which they received $5. Then, they were given the essay-writing instructions 
used in Experiment 1 but this time we used a different prompt for the control condition. We 
asked participants to ―Please think about your life as a student in high school and good memories 
you have from it. Please write a few paragraphs describing them and one event that you still 
remember to this date. Please provide as many details as possible so that another person reading 
what you wrote could understand how you felt at that time.‖ Participants received $5 for this 
second task, which included writing essays and answering a series of short questionnaires.  
After writing their essays about memories from their childhood or memories from their 
time in high school, participants completed a 2-item measure of nostalgia (from Zhou, Sedikides, 
Wildschut, & Gao, 2008): ―Right now, I am feeling quite nostalgic‖ and ―Right now, I am 
having nostalgic feelings‖ (α=.88) using a 7-point scale (1=Strongly disagree, 7=Strongly agree).  
Next, they completed the word-completion task. In this task, participants received a list of 
words with letters missing and were asked to fill in the blanks to make complete, meaningful Memory Lane and Morality  19 
words using the first word that came to mind. Of the six word fragments, three (P _ R _, M _ R _ 
_, and V _ R T _ _) could be completed as words related to moral purity (pure, moral, and virtue) 
or as unrelated words (e.g., part, mural, and vortex). 
Participants then completed the 20-item version of the PANAS (α=.70 for positive affect 
and α=.90 for negative affect, Watson et al., 1988), and rated their agreement with the two moral 
purity items and the five personality-related filler items used in Experiment 1. Participants were 
asked to respond to these statements on the basis of how they were feeling at that moment in an 
attempt to measure state moral purity. The mean of the two moral purity items was used as the 
measure of moral purity (α=.80). 
Finally, participants were informed they had completed the study. The final instructions 
informed them they could donate money for the victim of the Japan earthquake (the earthquake 
happened about a month before the experiment took place): 
Our research team is interested in collecting donations for the victims of the Japan 
earthquake. Please indicate if you are willing to make a donation. If so, we‘ll ask you to 
leave money in the envelope next to the computer. If you do not have money with you 
but intend to donate please write the amount you intend to donate below (next question) 
with your name. You can bring the money to the lab any day of the week this week. 
 
All the participants who indicated they wanted to donate money made their donation at 
the time of the session. (We note that the amount participants specified in the question regarding 
their willingness to donate matched the amount participants actually donated by leaving money 
in the envelope.) 
Finally, participants completed a final questionnaire where they reported demographic 
information, answered the two-item manipulation check (α=.77), were asked to guess the study 
hypotheses, and were debriefed. 
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Preliminary analyses. No participant guessed any of the study hypotheses, and no 
participants reported suspicion in this study. Therefore, we did not exclude any participants from 
our analyses.  
Manipulation check. Participants who wrote an essay about their childhood reported the 
task made them think about their childhood significantly more (M=4.68, SD=0.99) than did those 
who wrote about their time in high school (M=2.74, SD=0.86), t(85)=9.74, p<.001, d=.2.09. 
Moral purity. Participants in the childhood-memories condition reported greater moral 
purity (M=3.28, SD=1.16) than did participants in the control condition (M=2.13, SD=1.09), 
t(85)=4.79, p<.001, d=1.03. This result was mirrored by the implicit measure of moral purity we 
included in the experiment. Participants in the childhood-memories condition used significantly 
more words related to moral purity in the word-completion task (M=1.41, SD=0.82) than did 
participants in the control condition (M=0.81, SD=0.88), t(85)=3.27, p=.002, d=0.70. In fact, the 
explicit and implicit measures of moral purity were significantly and positively correlated with 
one another (r=.52, p<.001). 
Amount donated. Consistent with the increase in helping observed in Experiment 1, 
participants who wrote about childhood memories donated more money to the victims of the 
Japan earthquake (M=$2.02, SD=1.83) than did participants in the control condition (M=$1.23, 
SD=1.79), t(85)=2.04, p=.045, d=0.44. A larger percentage of participants in the remembering-
childhood condition (63.6%, 28 out of 44) donated money compared to that in the control 
condition (41.9%, 18 out of 43), χ
2(1, N=87)=4.14, p=.042, Cramer‘s V=0.22. Based on the odds 
ratio, participants were 2.43 times more likely to donate if they recalled childhood memories 
than if they recalled memories from high school. Together, these results indicate that childhood 
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Mediation by moral purity. When both condition and moral purity were entered into a 
regression predicting donated amount of money (our measure of prosocial behavior), condition 
was no longer significant (b=-.15, SE b=.38; t=-0.40, p=.69), whereas moral purity significantly 
predicted prosocial behavior (b=0.81, SE b=.15; t=5.38, p<.001). The Preacher and Hayes (2004) 
bootstrapping technique (with 10,000 iterations) produced a 95% confidence interval for the 
indirect effect that excluded zero ([0.50, 1.58]). Thus, moral purity significantly mediated the 
relationship between childhood memories and prosocial behavior. Note that we obtained support 
for mediation also when considering the likelihood to donate rather than the amount donated as 
the dependent variable, and also when considering the implicit measure of moral purity as the 
mediator in analyses with either dependent variable. 
Nostalgia and affect. Nostalgia, and the mean of the positive affect words from the 
PANAS were not mediators for the effect. Although participants who recalled and wrote about 
memories from their childhood did report being more nostalgic after writing the essay (M=3.98, 
SD=1.14) than did participants in the control condition (M=2.45, SD=1.36), t(85)=5.55, p<.001, 
d=1.19, the effect of nostalgia was not significant in a mediation model predicting the amount of 
money donated from condition and nostalgia (b=-.08, SE b=.16; t<1, p=.62). As for affect, we 
did not find significant differences in either positive affect or negative affect, both ts(85)<1. 
Discussion 
Consistent with Experiment 1, participants who recalled childhood memories donated 
more money to victims of the Japan earthquake than did participants in a control condition. 
Mirroring this result, a larger proportion of participants in the childhood-memories condition 
engaged in prosocial behavior by donating some money as compared to those in the control 
condition. Experiment 2 also provides further support for the hypothesis that moral purity Memory Lane and Morality  22 
mediates the relationship between childhood memories and prosocial behavior by using both an 
implicit and an explicit measure of moral purity. Recalling childhood memories caused people to 
feel morally pure, and as a result, they behaved prosocially. 
These data also constitute evidence against a plausible alternative explanation for the 
effect of childhood memories. People who wrote about positively-valenced memories from their 
own childhood felt more nostalgic after describing the event than did people who wrote about an 
event in their more recent past (high-school). This is consistent with other research showing that 
people feel nostalgic after recalling an event from their past, especially when it is from a distant 
past (e.g., Sedikides et al., 2008; Wildschut et al., 2006). Nostalgic feelings did not mediate the 
relationship between recalling memories from one‘s own childhood and increased prosocial 
behavior. Similarly, positive affect did not differ depending on whether participants recalled 
childhood versus not. We instead found support for our hypothesis that moral purity is the 
mediator. 
Experiment 3: Manipulating Moral Purity 
Our first two experiments demonstrated that the relationship between childhood 
memories and prosocial behavior is mediated through moral purity, using both explicit and 
implicit measures. Experiment 3 explored this same process through moderation. In addition to 
manipulating the type of memories we asked participants to recall and write about (childhood 
memories vs. control), we introduced a manipulation of moral purity to test whether priming 
participants with the concept of moral purity would lead to greater prosocial behavior only for 
those in the control condition (who did not already feel morally pure after the recall task). 
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Participants and design. One-hundred and one students and staff members (42 male; 
Mage=23.82; SD=7.92) from a university in the Southeastern United States participated in a 30-
minute laboratory study for $6. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in 
a 2 (memories: childhood memories vs. control condition) X 2 (priming: neutral vs. moral purity) 
between-subjects design. 
Procedure. Participants were informed that they would be completing a series of 
unrelated task. First, they completed the same writing task as in Experiment 2. We used this task 
to manipulate the type of memories participants recalled: childhood vs. high-school memories.  
As their second task, participants completed a scrambling-sentence task that exposed 
them to moral-purity related words or neutral words (from Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008). 
Participants were told that, ―This is a test of how people perceive word relationships according to 
their first immediate impression. It consists of sets of four words which are in a ―scrambled‖ 
order. By selecting 3 words in a set, you can make a complete sentence.‖ Participants were given 
40 sets of words and were told to choose any combination of three words they wished, as long as 
they made a complete sentence. They were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the 
neutral prime condition, all 40 sets of words formed neutral sentences. In the moral-purity prime 
condition, 20 of the sets included words related to the theme of purity and cleanliness (e.g., pure, 
washed, clean, immaculate, pristine), and the other 20 sets contained only neutral words. For 
example, participants in the moral purity condition were asked to construct a sentence out of the 
set of words: they felt clean I and immaculate fresh felt she.  
Once participants completed the scrambling-sentence task, they proceeded to the next 
task which included two measures of moral purity (we counterbalanced the order in which we 
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Experiment 2, and a new measure of moral purity (which substituted the self-reported measure 
used in Experiments 1 and 2). For the new measure, we asked participants to indicate their 
preferences for five different products shown in pictures presented on the screen. One of the 
product choices was between two stuffed animals: a white lamb and a black bear (see Appendix 
for pictures). The other four choices were neutral. Given the demonstrated association between 
white and moral and black and immoral (Sherman & Clore, 2009), we coded participants‘ 
preference for the white lamb as a preference for moral purity.
2  
At the end of the study, participants were presented with an opportunity to donate (a task 
adapted from Twenge et al., 2007: Experiment 1). Participants received $6 (4 dollars in $1 bills 
and 8 quarters) and were told that the money was theirs to do with as they wished. Participants 
were told that the money was in quarters because participants in other conditions had the money 
doled out to them over the course of the experiment. At the end of the study, the experimenter 
mentioned that she needed to grab the final questionnaire from another room and said, ―Before I 
go, I want to mention that we‘re taking up a collection for the Student Emergency Fund. It‘s a 
good cause. If you‘d like to donate, that would be great. If not, that‘s totally fine too.‖ As she 
said this, she pointed to the box on the table, which had a slit in the top, a sign reading ―Student 
Emergency Fund,‖ and a description detailing the purpose of the fund: helping undergraduates 
with unanticipated expenses. The experimenter explained that if participants did not want to 
donate, they would have to put no money in the envelope for the donation located on their desk 
but had to still place the envelope in the donation box. (In this way we assured that participants 
were not influenced by the decisions of others.)  
                                                      
2 We conducted a pilot study on a non-overlapping group of participants (N=48) to confirm that the white lamb 
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The experimenter then left the room for about two minutes before returning to ask 
participants to complete the final questionnaire, which included demographic questions, a two-
item manipulation check for the type of memories recalled (α=.84) and prompts for suspicion. 
Then, she debriefed participants. After participants left, the experimenter counted the money in 
the box. Participants left their donation in an envelope with a small-printed lab ID on it so that 
we could track the amount each participant donated (if any). 
We expected the moral-purity prime to moderate the relationship between childhood 
memories and prosocial behavior such that this prime would promote virtuous behavior only in 
the control condition. In fact, in the childhood memories condition, we expected participants to 
already feel morally pure because of the recall task in which they wrote about memories from 
their childhood.  
Results 
Preliminary analyses. No participant guessed any of the study hypotheses, and no 
participants reported suspicion in the final questionnaire. Therefore, we did not exclude any 
participants from our analyses.  
Manipulation check. A 2 (memory recalled) X 2 (prime) ANOVA revealed only a 
significant effect for our childhood-memories manipulation, F(1,97)=64.58, p<.001, ηp
2=.40: 
Participants who recalled and wrote about their childhood reported the task made them think 
about their childhood significantly more (M=4.38, SD=1.00) than did those who wrote about 
their time in high school (M=2.61, SD=1.19). 
Moral purity. A similar analysis using our implicit measure of moral purity revealed a 
significant interaction between our two manipulations, F(1,97)=4.73, p=.032, ηp
2=.047. In the 
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of moral purity (Mpurity_prime=1.21, SD=1.22 vs. Mneutral_prime=0.38, SD=0.71), F(1,97)=8.06, 
p=.006. Instead, in the childhood-memories condition, we found no differences in the number of 
moral words recalled based on the type of prime participants had received (Mpurity_prime=1.26, 
SD=1.10 vs. Mneutral_prime=1.31, SD=0.97), F(1,97)<1, p=.89. 
We found similar results when considering the choice for the stuffed animal signaling a 
preference for purity (i.e., the white lamb), B=-2.06 (SE=.89), Wald=5.36, p=.021. In the control 
condition, being exposed to the moral purity prime increased participants‘ likelihood to choose 
the white lamb (62.5% vs. 16.7%), χ
2(1, N=48)=10.54, p=.001, Cramer‘s V=0.47. Instead, in the 
childhood-memories condition, we found no differences in the percentage of participants who 
chose the white lamb based on the type of prime (59.3 % vs. 57.7%), χ
2(1, N=53)<1, p=.91, 
Cramer‘s V=0.02. 
We note that these two measures assessing moral purity were positively and significantly 
correlated (r=.38, p<.001). 
Amount donated. We conducted a similar analysis using the amount donated as the 
dependent variable. As predicted, the interaction between our two manipulation was significant, 
F(1,97)=4.52, p=.036, ηp
2=.045. In the control condition, the moral purity prime increased the 
amount participants donated (Mpurity_prime=$0.91, SD=1.01 vs. Mneutral_prime=$0.20, SD=0.44), 
F(1,97)=7.56, p=.007. Instead, in the childhood-memories condition, we found no differences in 
the amount participants donated based on whether they had been exposed to a moral purity or a 
neutral prime (Mpurity_prime=$0.92, SD=1.01 vs. Mneutral_prime=$0.96, SD=0.96), F(1,97)<1, p=.87.
3 
                                                      
3 We also note that participants who wrote about childhood memories donated more money (M=$0.94, SD=0.98) 
than did participants in the control condition (M=$0.55, SD=0.85), F(1,97)=3.80, p=.031, ηp
2=.05. The effect of our 
prime manipulation was only marginally significant (F[1,97]=3.45, p=.07, ηp
2=.034) such that the moral purity 
prime increased the amount donated (Mpurity_prime=$0.91, SD=1.00 vs. Mneutral_prime=$0.60, SD=0.84). Memory Lane and Morality  27 
We found the same results when considering the percentage of participants who decided to 
donate, which is depicted in Figure 1. 
Moderated mediation. Next, we examined whether our implicit measure of moral purity 
would explain the moderating effect of the prime on the relationship between childhood 
memories and the amount participants donated, using a moderated path analysis (Edwards & 
Lambert, 2007). We expected that the prime would moderate the effect of childhood memories 
on moral purity, which would directly predict greater prosocial behavior. Regression analyses 
showed that when moral purity was entered into the equation, the interaction between our two 
manipulations became non-significant, whereas moral purity significantly predicted larger 
donations (Table 1). We computed simple effects for our childhood memories manipulation at 
two levels of the prime (moral purity prime vs. neutral prime) using bias-corrected confidence 
intervals, drawing 1000 random samples with replacement from the full sample. As shown in 
Table 2, we found support for moderated mediation: the prime participants had been exposed to 
moderated the indirect effect of childhood memories on the amount donated through our implicit 
measure of moral purity. Importantly, we find results in support of moderated mediation also 
when considering the preference for the white lamb as our measure of moral purity.   
Discussion 
  The results of Experiment 3 provide further support for our hypotheses by showing that 
childhood memories promote prosocial behavior through heightened moral purity. Importantly, 
in Experiment 3 we provided evidence for the process explaining the link between childhood 
memories and prosocial behavior using moderation: only in the control condition we found that 
participants increased the amount they donated when they were primed with moral purity.  
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So far, we have demonstrated that remembering childhood promotes prosocial behavior 
through heightened moral purity. In Experiment 4, we focus on a different type of prosocial 
behavior: punishment of the actions of others. We expected that childhood memories would lead 
people to judge the behavior of others more critically and to punish it more harshly. 
The design of Experiment 4 differed from our previous studies in another critical way. To 
increase the generalizability of our findings, instead of relying on university students, we used a 
different sample that included people who had children of their own. Having children may 
weaken the type of associations people make when remembering their own childhood. First, the 
daily grind of living with a child may desensitize a person. Alternatively, constantly taking care 
of a child may exhaust prosocial tendencies toward non-family members. It is also possible that 
parents may see their children as somewhat selfish. Because of these reasons, the association 
between childhood and moral purity may be strong only for individuals who do not have children 
of their own (very likely the students in Experiments 1-3).  
Method 
Participants. One hundred twenty adults (72 female; Mage=44.12; SD=14.87; age range: 
18-65) from a US representative online pool (recruited through Qualtrics) participated in the 
study in exchange for $4. Forty-one percent of the participants reported having children. 
Procedure. Participants were informed the study included several unrelated task. As their 
first task, they engaged in the writing task used in Experiments 2 and 3 for about 10 minutes. We 
used the writing task to introduce our manipulation of remembering childhood. Next, participants 
completed the implicit measure of moral purity (i.e., the word-fragment completion task) as well 
as the second measure of moral purity used in Experiment 3 (i.e., choosing between two stuffed 
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As their next task, participants completed a short version of the PANAS (positive affect, 
α=.91; negative affect, α=.94) and questions assessing nostalgia (α=.98) as in Experiment 2. 
After completing unrelated filler tasks for about 2 minutes, participants were presented with a 
scenario describing the behavior of another person, Steve. They were asked to read it carefully 
and then answer a few questions about it. The scenario read, 
Imagine that Steve has an important interview tomorrow, which will determine whether 
or not he will be able to get a really good job as an analyst. He is suitable for the job but 
he is worried about the interview being demanding. Steve is the type of person who does 
not perform at his best under stress. The questions for the interview will be chosen at 
random from a list that is kept in an online document which is password protected. Steve 
is the last person to leave the room after an introductory luncheon for all the job 
candidates. As he is about to leave, he notices that a company representative has left on 
the table a folder with information about tomorrow‘s interview. He has the opportunity to 
write down the password and use it to prepare for the interview. Nobody would ever learn 
about this. Steve decides to open the folder and copy the password on his notebook 
before leaving. 
 
Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they thought Steve‘s behavior was 
unethical, wrong, and morally inappropriate (α=.85) using a 7-point scale (1=Not at all, 7=Very 
much). They were then asked to imagine the person conducting the interview found out about 
Steve‘s actions, and then indicate how harshly they would punish the behavior if they were in the 
interviewer‘s shoes, even if punishing Steve‘s behavior meant potentially creating extra costs for 
the company by rescheduling the interviews (1=Not at all, 7=Very harshly). 
Finally, participants answered the same 2-item manipulation check used in our previous 
experiments (α=.85), followed by a few demographic questions. 
Results 
Manipulation check. Participants who recalled memories from their childhood reported 
the writing task made them think about the time they were children (M=4.92, SD=1.52) more Memory Lane and Morality  30 
than participants in the control condition (M=3.71, SD=1.74), t(118)=4.07, p<.001, d=0.74, 
suggesting that, once again, our manipulation was effective. 
Ethical judgment and punishment. Remembering events from their childhood affected 
participants‘ judgments of Steve‘s behavior. Participants reported Steve‘s behavior to be more 
unethical in the remembering-childhood condition (M=6.07, SD=1.08) than in the control 
condition (M=5.57, SD=0.87), t(118)=2.79, p=.006, d=0.51. They also indicated they would 
punish Steve‘s behavior more harshly if they were in the interviewer‘s shoes (M=5.49, SD=1.42 
vs. M=5.00, SD=1.20), t(118)=2.04, p=.043, d=0.37.  
Moral purity. Participants in the remembering-childhood condition completed the word-
fragment task with more purity-related words (M=1.26, SD=0.79) than did control participants 
(M=0.66, SD=0.76), t(118)=4.24, p<.001, d=0.78. In addition, they were more likely to choose 
the white lamb stuffed animal as their preferred choice in the product choice task, (55.7% vs. 
28.8%), χ
2(1, N=120)=8.90, p=.003, Cramer‘s V=0.27. The two measures of moral purity were 
positively and significantly correlated (r=.24, p=.009). 
Having children as moderator. We examined whether having children moderated the 
relationship between childhood memories and moral purity, and the relationship between 
childhood memories and ethical judgments. Regression analyses revealed no significant 
interaction between our manipulation of childhood memories and having children in predicting 
either outcome (both ps>.15). We found similar results when using ―having children below the 
age of 6‖ as the moderating variable. (We also note that the nature and significance of our results 
did not change when using ―having children‖ as a control variable in our analyses.) These results 
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Mediation by moral purity. When both condition and our implicit measure of moral 
purity were entered into a regression predicting ethical judgment, condition was no longer 
significant (b=.26, SE b=.18; t=1.41, p=.16), whereas moral purity significantly predicted ethical 
judgment (b=.40, SE b=.11; t=3.63, p<.001). The Preacher and Hayes (2004) bootstrapping 
technique (with 10,000 iterations) produced a 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect that 
excluded zero (.09 to .46), thus suggesting a significant indirect effect. We note that we find the 
same results in support for mediation when considering the choice of the white lamb as the 
mediator.  
Nostalgia and affect. The mean of both positive and negative affect words from the 
short-form PANAS did not differ between conditions (both ps>.63). As for nostalgia, it was 
about the same in both the childhood-memories condition (M=3.96, SD=1.64) and in the control 
condition (M=3.63, SD=1.84), t(118)=1.05, p=.30, d=0.19. 
Discussion 
In Experiment 4, recalling childhood memories led participants to be more critical of 
others‘ ethically-questionable behaviors and punish them more harshly, compared to a control 
condition. Furthermore, providing additional support for our predictions, we found that being 
reminded of memories from childhood led participants to experience a heightened sense of moral 
purity, and these feelings mediated the relationship between childhood memories and ethical 
judgments. Importantly, these effects were not moderated by having children: both parents and 
people without children experienced heightened moral purity when recalling memories from 
their childhood, and they both judged others‘ ethically-questionable behavior equally harshly. 
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In Experiments 1-4, participants who recalled memories from their childhood reported 
higher moral purity and engaged in more prosocial behavior than control participants. Our last 
study included a condition in which participants are asked to recall and write about negatively-
valenced memories from their childhood to test whether valence moderates the relationship 
between childhood memories and prosocial behavior. 
Method 
Participants. One hundred nine students and staff members (47 female; Mage=23.58; 
SD=4.48) from local universities in the Southeastern United States participated in a laboratory 
study in exchange for $6. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: good-
childhood memories, bad-childhood memories, or control condition. 
Procedure. Participants were informed that the study included several unrelated tasks. 
We used the same procedure as in Experiment 1, but with three important differences. First, we 
introduced a third condition. In the control condition and in the good-childhood memories 
condition, we used the same instructions for the writing task used in Experiments 2-4. In the bad-
memories condition, instead, we asked participants to ―think about your childhood and bad 
memories you have from it. Please write a few paragraphs describing them and one event that 
you still remember to this date.‖ Second, differently from Experiment 1, we included an implicit 
measure of moral purity (i.e., the word-completion task) rather than an explicit, self-reported 
measure. Third, at the end of study, participants answered not only the same 2-item manipulation 
check used in our previous studies (α=.88), but they also indicated the extent to which they wrote 
about a positive experience (1=not at all, 7=extremely). As in Experiment 1, our dependent 
variable was the likelihood of participants to help the experimenter with a supplementary task. 
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Preliminary analyses. Three participants were excluded from the analyses because they 
reported being suspicious of the request for help. No participant guessed any of the relationships 
being tested in the research. 
Manipulation check. Participants who recalled good memories from their childhood 
(M=5.36, SD=1.11) and those who recalled bad childhood memories (M=5.53, SD=1.13) both 
reported the writing task made them think more about the time they were children compared to 
control participants (M=2.77, SD=1.34; p<.001 for both comparisons), F(2,103)=59.61, p<.001, 
ηp
2=.54. Participants‘ answer on this manipulation check was no different between the two 
childhood-memories conditions (p=.55). These results suggest that, once again, our manipulation 
was effective.  
Participants also indicated the extent to which they wrote about a positive experience. 
Their rating on this question varied by condition, F(2,103)=48.84, p<.001, ηp
2=.49: it was higher 
in the good-childhood-memories condition (M=6.03, SD=1.36), followed by the control 
condition (M=4.36, SD=1.81), and it was the lowest in the bad-childhood-memories condition 
(M=2.17, SD=1.71; p<.001 across all comparisons). 
Helping. Participants‘ likelihood to help also varied by condition in the same direction, 
χ
2(1, N=106)=6.97, p=.031, Cramer‘s V=0.26. Participants were more likely to help in the good-
childhood-memories condition (57.1%, 20/35) and in the bad-childhood-memories condition 
(51.4%, 18/35) than in the control condition (27.8%, 10/36; p<.05 for both comparisons). 
Helping did not significantly vary depending on the valence of the childhood memories that 
participants recalled (p=.63). 
Accessibility to moral-purity related concepts. Participants in the good-childhood-
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words related to moral purity in the word-completion task (M=1.34, SD=0.87 and M=1.43, 
SD=0.95, respectively) than did participants in the control condition (M=0.89, SD=0.92; p<.05 
for both comparisons), F(2,103)=3.59, p=.031, ηp
2=.07. Accessibility to moral purity concepts 
did not differ between the two childhood memories conditions (p=.70). 
Mediation by moral-purity. When we entered both childhood memories (1 for both 
good and bad childhood memories, and 0 for the control condition) and our measure of moral 
purity into a logistic regression model predicting helping, moral purity was significant (b=.95, 
SE b=.26), Wald χ
2=13.47, p<.001, but condition was no longer significant (b=.82, SE b=.48), 
Wald χ
2=2.91, p=.09. The Preacher and Hayes (2004) bootstrapping technique (with 10,000 
iterations) produced a 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect that excluded zero (.10 to 
1.08). Thus, our implicit measure moral purity significantly mediated the relationship between 
childhood memories and helping.  
Positive and negative affect. On average, positive affect (α=.94) was higher in the good-
childhood-memories condition (M=4.83, SD=1.38) compared to both the bad-childhood-
memories condition (M=3.95, SD=1.58) and the control condition (M=3.76, SD=1.50; p<.02 for 
both comparisons), F(2,103)=5.13, p=.007, ηp
2=.09. As for the mean score of negative affect 
(α=.96), it was higher in the bad-childhood-memories condition (M=2.80, SD=1.50) compared to 
both the good-childhood-memories condition (M=1.76, SD=1.52) and the control condition 
(M=1.43, SD=0.78; p<.01 for both comparisons), F(2,103)=10.66, p<.001, ηp
2=.17. Yet, these 
emotions were not significant in a mediation model predicting helping from condition and affect 
(positive affect: b=.04, SE b=.13, Wald χ
2<1; negative affect: b=-.04, SE b=.15; Wald χ
2<1). 
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In Experiment 5, recalling childhood memories, compared to a control condition, led 
participants to experience a heightened sense of moral purity, and to greater helping. In addition, 
the results of this study show that the valence of the childhood memories participants recalled 
did not moderate the link between childhood memories and prosocial behavior: both positively-
valenced and negatively-valenced childhood memories led to a heightened sense of moral purity, 
and promoted participants‘ likelihood to help. 
General Discussion 
In five experiments, we found that people experience a heightened sense of moral purity 
and are thus more likely to behave prosocially after recalling memories from their own childhood 
than neutral events or memories from their more recent past (i.e., time in high school).  
In Experiment 1, participants instructed to recall childhood memories were more likely to 
help the experimenter with a supplementary task than were participants in a control condition. 
This effect was mediated by self-reported moral purity. In Experiment 2, childhood memories 
increased the amount of money participants donated to a good cause compared to memories from 
one‘s experience in high school, and this effect was mediated by both an implicit and an explicit 
measure of moral purity. Experiment 2 also showed that nostalgia or other positive affect after 
recalling and writing about one‘s own childhood did not mediate the effect. In Experiment 3, we 
provided evidence for moral purity as mediator explaining the relationship between childhood 
memories and prosocial behavior through moderation. In Experiment 4, childhood memories led 
participants to judge the ethically-questionable behavior of others more critically and punish it 
more harshly. Finally, in Experiment 5, participants who recalled childhood memories were 
more likely to help. This study also demonstrated that the valence of childhood memories does 
not moderate the link between recalling one‘s own childhood and prosocial behavior. Memory Lane and Morality  36 
Taken together, these experiments support a model in which remembering childhood 
leads to heightened moral purity, which, in turn, promotes prosocial behavior. We found that 
one‘s perceived moral purity as well as the activation of morality-related constructs in one‘s 
mind can change from moment to moment—increasing when individuals remember their own 
childhood—and that they can encourage prosocial behavior, even in domains unrelated to the 
original event that made them feel morally pure. We also captured the effect using a range of 
outcomes, such as helping an experimenter, donating money to a good cause, and punishing the 
actions of others more harshly. 
Together, these results make several contributions to the extant literature. First, extending 
prior work on autobiographical memory, we proposed and found that childhood memories 
activate the concept of moral purity that, in turn, promotes prosocial behavior. Prior research has 
stressed the important role autobiographical memory plays in forming our identity. Here, we 
demonstrated that by eliciting a sense of purity and innocence, childhood memories impact one‘s 
moral self-concept, with important consequences for behavior.  
Second, we provide a definition for the construct of moral purity and establish the 
powerful consequences it has on individual ethical behavior. Although prior work in moral 
psychology has referred to moral purity (for instance when examining the consequences or 
antecedents of physical purity), it has provided no definition for this construct. We hope that by 
defining moral purity and demonstrating effective ways of measuring it we will inspire future 
work in this important area. 
Third, these results contribute to existing research on the determinants of prosocial 
behavior. Several scholars have focused on the role of emotions such as sympathy (feeling 
concern for the other) and empathy (feeling as the other feels) in predicting increased prosocial Memory Lane and Morality  37 
behaviors and reduced antisocial behaviors (e.g., Batson, 1991, 1998; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; 
Miller & Eisenberg, 1988). Here, we identified another important internal state that promotes 
prosocial behavior, namely the conscious and unconscious experience of moral purity triggered 
by childhood memories. While sympathy and empathy are feelings individuals experience in 
relations to other people, moral purity seems to be a more self-focused state, which can motivate 
other-oriented behaviors. 
Our work also contributes to research on moral psychology and behavioral ethics. Over 
the last few decades, scholars have examined when and why even good people cross ethical 
boundaries, and have proposed that the more accurate explanations for immoral behavior may 
reside in underlying psychological processes (Ayal & Gino, 2011; Messick & Bazerman, 1996). 
Consistent with this view, studies have identified various psychological factors that consciously 
or unconsciously influence the decision to behave unethically (e.g., Chugh, Bazerman, & Banaji, 
2005; Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008; Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009; Monin & Jordan, 2009). We 
extend this research by identifying a potentially effective solution to the pervasiveness of selfish 
motives and dishonesty in today‘s society: recalling childhood memories. 
Limitations and Future Research 
These contributions must be qualified in light of several important limitations of our 
research. First, our investigation focused on how childhood memories lead to the activation of 
concepts related to morality and heightened moral purity. Beyond moral purity, nostalgia, and 
affect, there may be additional mechanisms through which childhood memories promote 
prosocial behavior. Future research exploring other-oriented emotions and behaviors resulting 
from recalling one‘s own childhood could deepen our understanding of the relationships we 
investigated in this paper. For example, it will be worthwhile to examine whether childhood Memory Lane and Morality  38 
memories motivate prosocial behavior by increasing individuals‘ sense of psychological 
connectedness to others or their desire to be socially included, strengthening the motivation to 
behave prosocially towards others. In the future, researchers could examine the possibility that 
these factors influence moral purity and prosocial behavior.  
Second, we used one particular manipulation for childhood memories: asking participants 
to recall and write about memories from their own childhood. We suggested that this type of 
autobiographical memory activates the concept of childhood. Future research could test the 
generalizability of our findings by using priming manipulations that activate the concept of 
childhood. For instance, research could test whether working in an office with colorful furniture, 
games and toys would lead to the same types of prosocial behaviors observed in our research.  
Third, we did not investigate the role of possible moderators, other than the influence of 
the valence of childhood memories and having one‘s own children. Several important factors, 
both situational and trait-based, may moderate the relationships investigated in this paper. For 
instance, self-importance of moral identity may reduce the beneficial effects of remembering 
childhood on prosocial behavior. Moral identity is an important source of moral motivation, 
leading to greater concordance between one‘s moral principles and actions (Aquino & Reed, 
2002; Blasi, 1995). Since a stronger sense of moral identity is associated with performing more 
prosocial behaviors (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002; Hardy, 2006), and less unethical behaviors 
(Aquino et al., 2009), the influence of childhood memories on prosocial behavior is likely to vary 
as a function of moral identity. People with a strong moral identity are more able to recognize 
their own moral objectives and social expectations by processing pre-existing moral conceptions 
and affective states before deciding upon a course of action (Bandura, 1991); thus, recalling Memory Lane and Morality  39 
childhood memories may produce stronger effects on behavior for people with a weak moral 
identity.  
Future work could also examine the two moderators we considered in Experiments 4 and 
5 in more detail, namely having children and recalling negative-valenced childhood memories. 
For instance, one could compare the behavior of first time parents to that of people without 
children. Or one could conduct a study on individuals who had particularly difficult childhood 
experiences. These would be more extreme conditions to test the moderating role of having 
children and recalling bad-childhood memories. Research using these samples could further our 
understanding of the consequences of childhood memories. 
Finally, our research focused on the benefits of childhood memories with little attention 
to its potential costs (e.g., increased selfish or self-serving motives). Here, we suggested and 
demonstrated that people commonly associate childhood with innocence and moral purity. This 
evidence is consistent with developmental psychology research suggesting that children‘s ability 
to act deceptively requires cognitive mechanisms that are immature in young humans (e.g., Hala, 
Chandler & Fritz, 1991), and with studies showing that children often behave prosocially (e.g., 
Hamlin et al., 2007; Jacob & Dupoux, 2008; Warneken et al., 2007). Childhood memories may 
thus also activate a sense of naiveté, since they might lead us to remember how very naïve we 
were when we were children, and how we could not think two steps ahead (e.g., ―if I give my ice 
cream to this stranger, I will not have any left for myself‖). However, other empirical studies in 
developmental psychology suggest that young children are quite selfish, and that selfishness 
decreases as they become older (e.g., Lane & Coon, 1972; Leventhal & Anderson, 1970). This 
literature suggests that childhood memories may activate other constructs in individuals‘ mind, 
such as selfishness or egocentrism. Future research examining the conditions under which one Memory Lane and Morality  40 
type of construct (e.g., moral purity) is activated rather than others (e.g., selfishness) would 
deepen our understanding of the relationship between childhood memories, morality and 
prosocial behavior.  
Conclusions 
Our research has shown that people who recall childhood memories experienced a sense 
of moral purity (both consciously and unconsciously), and behaved more prosocially towards 
others as a result. By contributing to our general understanding of the determinants of prosocial 
behavior, this research points toward one possible solution to people‘s tendency to engage in 
self-serving and selfish acts. Future research in this vein thus has the potential to identify novel 
and simple methods to encourage prosocial behavior in people: By using tasks that can help 
individuals remember or relieve memories from their childhood, one can encourage helping and 
various forms of other-oriented behaviors.  
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Appendix 
Stimuli used to measure moral purity, Experiment 3 
 
Instructions: If you were given the option to take a gift home with you, which of the following 
products would you rather choose to take home? Assume both stuffed animals are of the same 
size. 
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Tables 
Table 1 
Coefficient Estimates for Regression Analyses (Experiment 3) 
  Moral purity  Amount of money donated (in $) 
  B (SE)  Β  t  B (SE)  β  t 
Childhood memories (0=no, 1=yes)  .97 (.29)  .44  3.24**       
Moral purity prime (0=no, 1=yes)  .83 (.29)  .39  2.84**       
Childhood memories X Prime  -.88 (.41)  -.37  -2.18*       
r
2      .13**       
             
Childhood memories         .40 (.23)  .21  1.74 
Moral purity        .40 (.12)  .46  3.34** 
Moral purity prime        .11 (.23)  .06  .049 
Childhood memories X Prime        -.42 (.30)  -.20  -1.39 
Moral purity X Prime        .22 (.15)  .24  1.48 
r
2            .46*** 
 
Notes: * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Analysis of Simple Effects (Experiment 3) 
Moderator:    Stage  Effect 
Prime    First  Second  Direct  Indirect  Total 
   Neutral (0)    .93*  .40*  .40  .37*  .77* 
   Moral purity (1)    .05  .62*  -0.02  .03  .01 
       Differences    .88*  -.22  .42  .34  .76* 
 
Notes: Tests of differences for the first stage, second stage, and direct effect are equivalent to tests of the 
corresponding coefficients reported in Table 1. Tests of differences for the indirect and total effect were 
based on 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals derived from bootstrap estimates. Memory Lane and Morality  56 
Figures 
Figure 1. Percentage of participants who donated by condition, Experiment 3 
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